As a New Jersey family law attorney, I have often explained the difference between a divorce and an annulment. Many folks think that if the marriage was very short that they qualify for an annulment. However, this is not true. As a divorce lawyer I then explain to my client that one must show “fraud in the inducement” to marry in order to qualify for an annulment in the Family Part, Superior Court of New Jersey. Below, please find a draft Complaint For Annulment which contains more information as to what is required to successfully obtain an annulment.
LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD R. WEINSTEIN, LLC
Weinstein Professional Building
214 Highway 18 North, Suite 2A
East Brunswick, New Jersey 08816
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Jane Doe
JANE BROWN a/k/a/ JANE DOE,
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
CHANCERY DIVISION – FAMILY PART
DOCKET NO.: FM-12-9458-113
COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT
Plaintiff, Jane Brown, also known as Jane Doe resides at 900 Oak Lane, East Brunswick, Middlesex County, NJ.
1. On March 10, 2002 a form of ceremony of marriage took place between the plaintiff and the defendant at Somerset, NJ, in a civil ceremony.
2. The plaintiff was a bona fide resident of the State of New Jersey at the time of the commencement of the action.
DOMICILE WHEN CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE (All Causes of Action)
3. On May 3, 2007, the time the within cause of action arose, the Plaintiff was domiciled at 320 Lake St., East Brunswick, Middlesex County, and the State of New Jersey.
DOMICILE SINCE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE (All Causes of Action)
4. On May 3, 2007, the time the within cause of action arose, neither party was domiciled in the State of New Jersey. At the time within action is commenced, the Plaintiff is domiciled at 320 Lake St., Somerset County, and the State of New Jersey.
5. The defendant, John Doe, resides at 678 Lake St., Somerset, New Jersey.
PRIOR EXISTING MARRIAGE (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(1)(a)
6. Prior to March 10, 2002, the defendant was lawfully joined in wedlock to one ____________, who, when the ceremony of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was performed, was living and was the lawful wife of the defendant herein, said marriage never having been dissolved or annulled according to law, and then being in full force and effect. (Here, state history of prior termination of marriage and reasons why the termination of said marriage is invalid under New Jersey Law. An example is the following: On or about the ___________ day of _________________, 20____, defendant secured a decree of divorce from said Fannie First in the matter captioned. “John Doe, Complainant vs. Fannie Doe, Respondent” in The Circuit Court of Middlesex County, New Jersey (In Equity). Docket No. FM-7654-D, by the Honorable James Monroe, Jr. Said New Jersey decree of divorce is invalid on the grounds that: (1) that court lacked jurisdiction in that defendant’s representation in that case as to his residency in the State of New Jersey was a fraud, a sham and untrue, inasmuch as he was never a resident of that state: and (2) the purported judge who granted said purported divorce was not in fact appointed by the constituted authority and the decree was never filed in accordance with New Jersey law.
PROHIBITED DEGREE (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(1)(b)
7. The plaintiff and the defendant were related to each other by blood within degrees then prohibited by law for the marriage of such persons; more specifically, (Here state degree of consanguinity).
IMPOTENCE (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(1)(c)
8. When the ceremony of marriage took place, the defendant was physically and incurably impotent to consummate the marriage. The exact nature of the cause or causes of the defendant’s impotence was at the time of the marriage unknown to plaintiff.
INCAPACITY TO CONSENT (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(1)(d)
9. When the ceremony took place, the defendant was (Here, state the basis of the defendant’s incapacity to consent. An example is the following: physically and mentally addicted to and dependent upon heroin). Said condition was at the time of the purported marriage unknown to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has not subsequently ratified the marriage.
NONAGE (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(1)
10. When the ceremony of marriage took place, the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years, and since reaching such age, has not confirmed the marriage.
GENERAL EQUITY JURISDICTION (N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1(1)(f)
11. At and prior to the ceremony of marriage, (Here state reasons for the court to exercise its general equity jurisdiction. An example is the following: defendant represented to the plaintiff that she was a practicing and devout member of the Catholic Church. Defendant was not at the time, nor at any other time, a practicing and devout member of the Catholic Church, having been born into the Church of Latter Day Saints. Defendant knew of such misrepresentation to the plaintiff and intended that he rely upon same, which in fact he did).
12. When the ceremony of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was performed, plaintiff was ignorant of the facts set forth hereinabove and believed that defendant was free to marry plaintiff and the plaintiff has not ratified the marriage since learning the facts set forth hereinabove.
13. No children were born of the purported marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.
14. There have been no previous matrimonial actions between the parties.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as to the First Count:
A. Declaring and adjudging the purported marriage between the parties to be null and void.
B. Compelling the defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff.
C. Directing the payment of the plaintiff’s counsel fees and costs.
D. For such further relief as the court may deem just and equitable.
1. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the First Count hereof as though set out herein at full length and made a part hereof.
2. On or about July 4, 2005, the plaintiff and the defendant acquired as tenants by the entirety, certain lands and premises commonly known as 900 Oak Lane, in the town of Somerset County, and State of New Jersey, more particularly described as Block 33333, Lot 88888, on the Tax Map of said municipality.
3. The plaintiff desires that a fair partition of said lands be made to her and the defendant according to their rights and interests as set forth above, or, if actual partition cannot be made without great prejudice to those entitled to share therein, that such lands be sold and the proceeds divided among the plaintiff and the defendant, and any other persons entitled to share therein according to their rights and interests, as set forth above.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as to the Second Count:
A. That a fair partition of the lands may be made among the plaintiff and the defendant and any other persons entitled to share therein according to their respective rights and interests.
B. That the liens, if any, on the individual interests of any parties be charged to the share assigned to such party, but subject to a charge on such share of its just proportion of the costs of this action and to a charge of the sum which shall be found to be due to the plaintiff for moneys expended by her for taxes, etc., in preference to such lien.
C. If actual partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the respective parties or is impracticable, that the lands be sold.
D. If a sale be had, that from the proceeds thereof, there shall be paid the costs of this action, the amount found due to the plaintiff and the defendant, each for moneys expended by her and him, respectively, and to the plaintiff for taxes etc,. and the balance divided between the plaintiff and the defendant and such other parties entitled to share therein according to their respective rights and interests; the portion of the moneys arising from the sale of any share against which there are existing liens or encumbrances held by any creditor who is a party hereto shall be paid into this court to be disposed of as this court may direct.
E. That an account be taken of the sums of money expended by the plaintiff in the payment of taxes, etc., and that the proportionate amount of such expenditures which should have been paid by the several parties in interest and that in the case of actual partition, the respective proportionate amount be adjudged a lien upon the respective shares assigned to such parties, or, that in the case of sale, the sum so found due to such plaintiff shall be paid to her prior to the payments to the parties of their shares in the proceeds.
F. For such further relief as the court may deem just and equitable.
DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL
Please take notice that pursuant to the provisions of R. 4:25-4, David Shaw, Esq. is designated as trial counsel for the Plaintiff in the within-captioned matter.
DATED: __________________, 20______.
Edward R. Weinstein, Esq.
CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO R. 4:5-1 AND R. 5:4-2(h)
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, and I make this certification pursuant to R. 4:4-2(h) and R. 4:5-1.
2. Pursuant to R. 4:5-1, the matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any Court, nor the subject of a pending arbitration proceeding. Also, no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated. Further, other than the parties set forth in this pleading, no other party shall be joined in the within action, and, in the event that there is a change in the facts stated herein, each party has a continuing obligation to file and serve upon all other parties and the court an amended certification.
3. Pursuant to R. 5:4-2(h), I have provided my client with a copy of the document “Divorce – Dispute Resolution Alternatives to Conventional Litigation”. Moreover, I have discussed with my client the complementary dispute resolution alternatives to litigation contained in that document.
I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
DATED: ___________________, 20____.
Edward R. Weinstein, Esq.